Withholding Performance in Football Employment Contracts: The limits of exceptio non adimpleti contractus after Levski-Houbtchev and the 2027 RSTP reform

This article examines the limits of withholding performance in football employment contracts through the doctrine of exceptio non adimpleti contractus. Using the FIFA decision in Petar Houbtchev v PFC Levski Sofia as its central case study, it analyses when a club, player or coach may rely on the other party’s alleged non-performance to suspend its own obligations. The article explains that the doctrine remains available in principle under Swiss law, but only as a narrow, temporary and good-faith defence subject to notice, proportionality, proof and football-specific regulations.

The article highlights that Levski-Houbtchev is best understood as a negative exceptio case, where a club already in prolonged salary default could not rely retrospectively on alleged non-performance by the coach to justify its own breach. The article also considers the 2027 RSTP reform, concluding that the future of exceptio in football is not disappearance but discipline: it survives where it supports contractual balance, but fails where it is used to disguise pressure, delay payment or avoid procedures protecting contractual stability.